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The Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) is the only reusable large liquid rocket engine 
ever developed.  The specific impulse delivered by the staged combustion cycle, substantially 
higher than previous rocket engines, minimized volume and weight for the integrated 
vehicle.  The dual pre-burner configuration permitted precise mixture ratio and thrust 
control while the fully redundant controller and avionics provided a very high degree of 
system reliability and health diagnosis.  The main engine controller design was the first 
rocket engine application to incorporate digital processing.  The engine was required to 
operate at a high chamber pressure to minimize engine volume and weight.  Power level 
throttling was required to minimize structural loads on the vehicle early in flight and 
acceleration levels on the crew late in ascent.  Fatigue capability, strength, ease of assembly 
and disassembly, inspectability, and materials compatibility were all major considerations in 
achieving a fully reusable design.  During the multi-decade program the design evolved 
substantially using a series of block upgrades.  A number of materials and manufacturing 
challenges were encountered throughout SSME’s history.  Significant development was 
required for the final configuration of the high pressure turbopumps.  Fracture control was 
implemented to assess life limits of critical materials and components.  Survival in the 
hydrogen environment required assessment of hydrogen embrittlement.  Instrumentation 
systems were a challenge due to the harsh thermal and dynamic environments within the 
engine.  Extensive inspection procedures were developed to assess the engine components 
between flights.  The Space Shuttle Main Engine achieved a remarkable flight performance 
record.  All flights were successful with only one mission requiring an ascent abort 
condition, which still resulted in an acceptable orbit and mission.  This was achieved in large 
part via extensive ground testing to fully characterize performance and to establish 
acceptable life limits.  During the program over a million seconds of accumulated test and 
flight time was achieved.  Post flight inspection and assessment was a key part of assuring 
proper performance of the flight hardware.  By the end of the program the predicted 
reliability had improved by a factor of four.  These unique challenges, evolution of the 
design, and the resulting reliability will be discussed in this paper. 
I. The Amazing Space Shuttle Main Engine 
 The Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) was the only large reusable, liquid rocket engine in the world.  It 
operated at greater temperature extremes than any mechanical system in common use today.  The SSME used as fuel 
the second coldest liquid on Earth, liquid hydrogen at -423 degrees Fahrenheit.  When the hydrogen burned with 
liquid oxygen, the temperature in the engine's main combustion chamber reached +6000 degrees Fahrenheit, higher 
than the boiling point of iron.  The maximum equivalent horsepower developed by the three SSMEs used on every 
Space Shuttle flight was just over 37 million horsepower, equivalent to the output of 13 Hoover Dams.  Although 
not much larger than an automobile engine, the SSME high-pressure fuel turbopump generates 70,000 horsepower 
or 70 horsepower for each pound of its weight, while an automobile engine generated approximately one-half 
horsepower for each pound of its weight.  Even though the SSME weighed one-seventh as much as a locomotive 
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engine, its high-pressure fuel turbopump alone delivered as much horsepower as 28 locomotives, while its high-
pressure oxidizer turbopump delivered the equivalent horsepower for 11 more.  SSME was the first engine with both 
chamber pressure and mixture ratio close-loop control, with autonomous controller and health management, and 
with variable throttling.  SSMEs were the only large rocket engines in the world to achieve one million seconds of 
operation consuming approximately 300 million gallons of propellant, and they operated safely and successfully on 
all 135 Space Shuttle flights. 
The SSME was a staged-combustion cycle engine with a nominal burn time in flight of approximately 8.5 
minutes at 104.5% of rated power level (RPL).  A simplified SSME propellant flow schematic is shown in Figure 1. 
  
 
Figure 1.  Simplified SSME Propellant Flow Schematic 
As seen in Figure 1, liquid hydrogen entered the engine at the inlet to the Low Pressure Fuel Turbopump 
(LPFTP).  The LPFTP boosted the pressure of the fuel sufficiently to prevent cavitation of the High Pressure Fuel 
Turbopump (HPFTP). The fuel flowed from the HPFTP pump discharge and split three ways.  Part of the fuel was 
used to cool the Main Combustion Chamber (MCC).  This MCC coolant flow was then directed to the LPFTP, 
where the then gaseous hydrogen powered the LPFTP turbine.  After discharging from the turbine, the flow then 
entered a coolant jacket around the engine powerhead.  This then hot gaseous hydrogen eventually entered the main 
injector for final engine combustion.  The remainder of the pump discharge flow, after cooling the nozzle, mixed 
with bypass flow and was directed to the preburners.  The two preburners operated at a fuel-rich mixture ratio, 
generating hot, hydrogen-rich steam to power the two high-pressure turbopump turbines.  Following discharge from 
the turbines, the hot gas was directed by the powerhead to the main injector for final combustion.2 
Liquid oxygen entered the engine at the inlet to the Low Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump (LPOTP) as seen in 
Figure 1.  The LPOTP boosted the pressure of the oxidizer sufficiently to prevent cavitation of the High Pressure 
Oxidizer Turbopump (HPOTP).  The HPOTP increased the oxidizer pressure, and the majority of the flow went 
directly to the main injector for engine combustion.  A portion of the HPOTP pump discharge flow was tapped off to 
enter a boost pump at the end of the HPOTP and was used to provide oxidizer at even higher pressure to the 
preburners.  Another portion of the HPOTP pump discharge flow was tapped off to power the LPOTP hydraulic 
turbine.  The LPOTP turbine flow then merged with the main LPOTP discharge flow. 2 
The staged-combustion cycle yields both high efficiency and system complexity along with high turbopump 
speeds and chamber pressures.  The engine’s low-weight compact design and high efficiency lead to a world-class 
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thrust-to-weight ratio of 66 at full power level.  SSME performance parameters for the final engine configuration are 
shown in Figure 2.  Throttle requirements ranged from 67% RPL, during the time early in ascent when maximum 
dynamic pressure was reached on the vehicle and again near Main Engine Cut-Off when the thrust was reduced to 
maintain no more than a 3G acceleration, to 104.5% RPL at mainstage and 109% RPL for certain abort modes 
(which were never implemented in flight).  Figure 3 depicts a nominal mission profile.  The control system 
employed redundancy known as fail-op, fail safe which required the engines to operate normally for the first control 
failure and then to shut down safely for the second failure. 
 
 
Propellants O2/H2 
Rated power level (RPL) 469,448 lb 
Nominal power level (104.5% RPL) 490,847 lb 
Full power level (109% RPL) 512,271 lb 
Chamber pressure (109% RPL) 2,994 psia 
Specific impulse at altitude 452 sec 
Throttle range (% RPL) 67 to 109 
Gimbal range +/- 11° 
Weight 7,748 lb 
Service life 55 flights 27,000 sec 
Total program hot-fire time 3,171 starts 1,095,677 sec 
Figure 2.  SSME Operational Characteristics 
 
 
Figure 3.  Typical SSME Mission Profile 
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II. Design Evolution1,2,5 
The Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) was designed and developed by Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne under 
contract to the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center.  The contract was awarded in 1971, and work on the engine 
began in 1972.  SSME engine-level testing commenced in 1975, and in the six years of development between the 
start of testing and the first flight, numerous SSME hardware redesigns took place.  These design-test-fail-fix 
iterations are typical of any engine development program, especially within the context of development of a new 
staged-combustion cycle, high thrust-to-weight, reusable liquid hydrogen engine.  Solutions to the problems 
depended on the severity of the issue.  Redesigns were implemented as soon as possible for many of the problems 
that were discovered, some issues could wait for resolution, and other problems were judged to be acceptable and 
were managed with life or inspection limits. 
In the SSME 40-year history, all of the major components were modified and improved.  Incremental, small 
changes were certified based on analysis and/or limited hot-fire testing.  More extensive changes were introduced in 
“phase” and “block” changes in order to conduct flight certification test programs on several changes at the same 
time, thus reducing test costs.  The design features in each upgraded configuration are listed in Table 1 and will be 
described below.  Figure 4 provides a timeline showing when the major block improvements were incorporated. 
 
Table 1.  SSME Configuration Details 
First 
Manned 
Orbital 
Flight 
Full Power Level 
or 
Phase I 
Phase II Block I Block IA Block IIA Block II 
1st Flight: 
STS-1 
4/12/1981 
1st Flight: 
STS-6 
4/4/1983 
1st Flight: 
STS-26R 
9/29/1988 
1st Flight:  
STS-70 
7/13/1995 
1st Flight: 
STS-73 
10/20/1995 
1st Flight: 
STS-89 
1/22/1998 
1st Flight: 
STS-104 
7/12/2001 
•Baseline 
Engine 
 
•Powerhead/Ducts 
− HGM fuel bowl liner 
mods 
− Lox post support 
pins in FPB 
− New flow meter 
straightener 
− LOX post  shields 
•HPFTP 
− Kel-F seals 
− Replaces stepped 
interstage seals with 
smooth 
− Increased clearance 
turbine blade 
clearance to tip seal 
•HPOTP 
− Housing material 
changed (INCO 903) 
•LPFTP 
− Revised blocking 
area 
•LPOTP 
− Turbine discharge 
turning vane mod 
•Avionics 
•Nozzle 
− Increased tube wall 
thickness 
− Added steam loop  
 
•HPFTP 
− Shot-peened fir trees 
− Large coolant discharge orifices 
•HPOTP 
− Bearing changes 
− PBP damping seals 
− Two-piece dampers 
− Non-scalloped interstage seal 
ring 
− Tapered interstage seal 
− Thick PBP bearing isolator 
added thermal shield 
− Bearing diametral clearances 
•MCC 
− EDNi reinforced outlet neck 
− Burst diaphragm drainline 
•HPF Duct Helium Barrier 
•Avionics/Valves 
− Increased strength MFV 
housing 
− Anti-backlash couplings 
− Potted wireways 
− Tight stack GCV 
− Modified pressure sensor cavity 
− Improved hot-gas temperature 
sensor 
− Spark igniter case structural 
improvements 
− 4k Hz monitor 
− Skin temp sensor added to Anti-
flood Valve 
•Phase II+ 
Powerhead       
(Two Duct) 
•Single Tube 
HEX 
•HPOTP/AT 
 
 
First Flight   
STS-75: 
•Thermocouples 
•Main Injector 
Modifications 
− Programmed 
secondary 
faceplate 
coolant holes 
•Large Throat 
MCC 
− Cast 
Inlet/Outlet 
Elbows 
− 20 -hole fuel 
sleeves 
•Block II LPOTP 
•Block II LPFTP 
•A-Cal software 
•Actuator spool 
material 
improvement 
•Filtered check 
valves 
•Pressure sensor 
improvements 
 
First Flight      
STS-96: 
•Opened 
boundary layer 
coolant (BLC) 
holes to minimize 
for faceplate 
erosion 
•HPFTP/AT 
•Main Fuel 
Valve 
•Non-integral 
Spark Igniter 
 
First Flight 
STS-117: 
•Advanced 
Health 
Management 
System 
− Real-time 
vibration 
monitoring 
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Figure 4.  SSME Configuration Timeline 
A. First Manned Orbital Flight SSME 
The First Manned Orbital Flight (FMOF) configuration was the baseline SSME design for the first five flights of 
the Space Shuttle.  These first Shuttle flights were intended to be the checkout phase of Space Shuttle operations.  
As such, engine power level was limited to 100% RPL, or 470,000 pounds vacuum thrust.  The FMOF configuration 
met safety requirements, but many of the components had limited operational life capability and had to be replaced 
much sooner than the 55 flight requirement.   
B. Full Power Level or Phase I SSME 
There was a possibility that payloads might exist that would require operation at Full Power Level (FPL), or 
109% RPL, so within two years of the first flight, a Full Power Level or Phase I configuration was introduced into 
the flight program.  This configuration flew from STS-6 on 
May 4, 1983 until the last flight of Challenger, STS-33 (51-
L) on January 28, 1986. 
One hundred forty-seven design changes to the FMOF 
configuration were deemed necessary for FPL operation 
including changes to the powerhead (Figure 5) and, perhaps 
most significantly, to the four turbopumps.  Changes were 
made to the main injector to eliminate LOX post cracking, 
and a steamloop was added to the nozzle feedline to 
eliminate a failure mode from high strains during the engine 
start transient.  With the higher power level testing and 
many changes being made in the design, many failures 
occurred. 
While the hardware and system modifications were quite 
successful at fixing many problems, several known failure 
modes and technical vulnerabilities were not addressed with 
the FMOF configuration.  Foremost among these 
vulnerabilities were serious turbine blade cracks, sub-
synchronous vibration, bearing cage delamination, and ball wear on the HPOTP.  At the conclusion of the FPL 
 
Figure 5.  SSME Powerhead, Main Combustion 
Chamber, and High Pressure Turbopumps 
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certification program, it was decided that sufficient margins still had not been obtained to allow flight at 109% RPL.  
The program restricted engine operation in flight to 104% or less and put a long term plan in place to achieve the 
higher operating power levels.1 
C. Phase II SSME 
 Following the 1986 Challenger disaster, the entire Space Shuttle Program was re-assessed.  Profound changes in 
SSME risk assessment and risk acceptance policies were implemented.  As part of these changes, the SSME Failure 
Modes and Effects Analysis/Critical Items List (FMEA/CIL) was completely rewritten.  The new document was 
more than 10 times longer than the original and identified 18 mandatory changes to the SSME hardware design, pre-
launch inspection requirements, and software prior to return to flight.  In addition, an SSME Margin Improvement 
Review Board identified 50 items as mandatory changes before returning to flight.1 
The Phase II configuration was flown on the return-to-flight mission STS-26R 
on September 29, 1988.  The new configuration included powerhead and duct 
changes.  Significant durability improvements to high pressure turbopump blades 
and bearings were part of the redesign as well as a Block II main engine controller 
(MEC) shown in Figure 6, not to be confused with the Block II engine configuration 
to be described later. 
HPOTP bearing problems continued to persist.  Additionally, the requirements 
forcing extremely light weight high pressure turbomachinery made the housings, 
shaft, and bearing systems insufficiently rigid to withstand internal failures meaning 
that the turbopumps performed very well during nominal operations, but in the event 
that something went wrong inside them, the failure would sometimes progress 
rapidly to gross, uncontained turbopump and engine failure. 
D. Block I/IA SSME 
The Block I SSME introduced several upgrades to the engine, improving reliability and safety.  The Phase II+ 
powerhead was included in the Block I and IA engine configurations and implemented a two-duct fuel-side hot-gas 
manifold which improved the high pressure fuel turbine discharge pressure distribution resulting in more uniform 
introduction of hot-gas products to the main injector, thus improving performance.  As part of the redesign effort, a 
concerted effort was undertaken to improve the design to make it more producible.  The redesigned powerhead had 
52 fewer piece-parts and 74 fewer welds.  The fabrication and assembly time was reduced by 40% and rework hours 
were reduced by almost 50%.1 
A new single-tube heat exchanger (HEX) replaced the bifurcated configuration.  The single-tube HEX 
eliminated all seven criticality 1 (would cause loss of crew and vehicle if they failed) interpropellant welds.  The 
new HEX also had a significantly thicker wall, which made it much less susceptible to impact damage and less 
vulnerable to through-wall wear at the bracket interface.  Prior to the redesign, the HEX was assessed as the top risk 
item on the SSME, primarily due to the number of critical welds, the extreme vulnerability of the thin walls, and the 
very rapid progression from a HEX rupture to a loss-of-vehicle failure.  The redesign very successfully mitigated 
these concerns. 
Baffles in the main injector were removed, which resulted in an efficiency gain in the engine as well as a 
producibility gain in the main injector.  The baffles had been in place to damp out potential combustion instabilities, 
but were proven to be unnecessary by main injector “bomb” testing conducted during engine ground tests on the 
Technology Test Bed test facility at the Marshall Space Flight Center. 
 
Figure 6.  Block II Main 
Engine Controller 
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The Block I engine incorporated a completely new HPOTP 
designed under a separate contract with Pratt & Whitney in West 
Palm Beach, Florida.  This new turbopump was specifically 
designed to eliminate critical failure modes and vulnerabilities in 
the original HPOTP.  A heavier allowable weight permitted a much stronger, stiffer rotor system, as well as more 
robust pump and turbine housings, which made the turbopump much more tolerant to internal failures and off-
nominal conditions than the previous design.  Advances in casting technologies permitted the incorporation of fine-
grained castings in the Block I HPOTP, which allowed the elimination of 293 welds within the turbopump, 
including all 250 welds for which there was no rootside access for inspection at fabrication.1  Silicon nitride rolling 
elements were used in the pump-end bearing virtually eliminating bearing wear and fatigue concerns.  Also, the 
turbopump was designed to use liquid hydrogen rather than liquid oxygen to cool the turbine-end bearing.  Blade 
cracks were essentially eliminated through the use of single-crystal alloy blades with thin-walled, hollow airfoils. 
 The final Block I change was an upgrade to the SSME turbine discharge temperature sensors.  These sensors 
were extremely critical to engine operation and serve as one of the few active redlines during flight.  The previous 
design was a Resistance Temperature Device (RTD) sensor, and while it had a very fast response time, the RTD 
sensor was very fragile and subject to fail during operation.  In fact, the only in-flight SSME premature shutdown 
(which led to an abort to orbit on STS-51F in 1985) was caused by a failure of the RTD temperature sensors.  The 
sensors were upgraded to a much more robust thermocouple design. 
All of these improvements resulted in an engine design capable of providing the required performance at much 
less risk.  The first flight of a Block I SSME was on STS-70 in July 1995.  Block IA incorporated all of the Block I 
features plus modifications to faceplate coolant holes in the main injector for increased performance.  Block IA flew 
for the first time on STS-73 in October 1995. 
E. Block IIA SSME 
The Block IIA SSME implemented the Large Throat Main Combustion Chamber (LTMCC) which had been 
touted as the single most important SSME reliability improvement.  The LTMCC increased the main chamber throat 
area by approximately 12% allowing the engine to operate at the same thrust level but at greatly reduced system 
pressures and temperatures.  For most engine components, operation at 109% RPL with a LTMCC is enveloped by 
operation at 104% RPL with a standard throat MCC.  Block IIA SSMEs were introduced on STS-89 in January 1998 
and flew until full implementation of the Block II SSME. 
The new LTMCC (Figure 8) had new features in addition to a 
larger throat size.  Inlet and outlet manifolds were changed from 
welded forgings to integral castings.  The cast manifolds eliminated 
46 welds, including 28 criticality 1 welds.1  The manifolds were cast 
from JBK-75, which is not susceptible to hydrogen embrittlement; 
thus the time-consuming, tedious operation of copper plating the 
interior of the outlet manifold was eliminated.  Manufacturability and 
production cycle time thus improved with the large throat MCC 
redesign. 
Minor modifications were required in the LPFTP and LPOTP to 
better match them to the lower pressures and speeds, and silicon 
nitride balls were implemented in the LPOTP thrust bearing.  The 
HPFTP received new turbine sheet metal with reduced welds, the 
purge-check valves incorporated filters to minimize contamination induced leakage, and the controller software was 
simplified.  These changes addressed maintenance issues and improved operating margins.1 
Similar to the temperature sensor upgrades incorporated in Block I, the SSME pressure sensors were redesigned 
and upgraded in Block II.  The redesign reduced internal metallic contamination, which previously caused shorts 
and spurious signals. 
Figure 7.  Block I High Pressure Oxidizer 
Turbopump 
 
Figure 8.  Large Throat Main 
Combustion Chamber 
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F. Block II SSME 
The Block II SSME added to the Block IIA design an advanced 
High Pressure Fuel Turbopump (Figure 9) along with miscellaneous 
minor changes in order to incorporate the new turbopump into the 
engine.  Like the advanced HPOTP introduced with Block I, the 
Block II HPFTP was developed under a separate contract with Pratt & 
Whitney in West Palm Beach, FL.  It utilized state-of-the-art robust 
designs and materials, significantly improving the safety and 
reliability of the SSME.  
The redesigned HPFTP incorporated improvements similar to 
those on the Block I HPOTP.  The new HPFTP had no welds and 
utilized silicon nitride rolling elements in both of its bearings.  It also 
incorporated robust, thick-walled turbine and pump housings to 
protect against internal failures.  The additional stiffness in the 
shaft/bearing system reduced synchronous vibrations by factors of 
two to four.1  Similar to the Block I HPOTP, single crystal alloy 
turbine blades with thin airfoils essentially eliminated blade cracking. 
By the time the alternate turbopumps were introduced into the 
Shuttle fleet in the mid 1990s, fracture control processes had been well defined.  Parts were identified as fracture 
critical if their failure due to cracking would result in a catastrophic event.  The fracture critical parts were inspected 
for pre-existing cracks, a fracture mechanics assessment was performed, materials traceability was instituted, and 
part-specific life limits were imposed as necessary.  This combination of inspection, analysis, and life limits ensured 
SSME fracture critical parts were flown with confidence.3  The Block II SSME first flew on STS-104 in July 2001. 
G. Block II SSME with Advanced Health Management System 
Following the successful implementation of the Block II design, the Advanced Health Management System 
(AHMS) was added.  This system utilized real-time vibration monitoring for the two high pressure turbopumps.  
Both turbopumps operated at high speeds, high pressures, and temperature extremes; and a flight vibration redline 
that could quickly detect structural failures in rotating components and shut down the engine was predicted to 
improve safety significantly.  However, prior to the Advanced Health Management (AHM) controller, the vibration 
sensing system was less reliable than the turbopumps.  To solve the problem of questionable sensor system data, 
digital signal processing hardware was incorporated into the Main Engine Controller (MEC) and advanced 
algorithms were developed for the software.  The improvements allowed the controller to capture high pressure 
turbopump accelerometer data, define the frequency content, and shut down the engine if synchronous vibration 
levels exceeded the redlines.  Advanced sensor qualification logic was also introduced to ensure the validity and 
accuracy of the vibration responses.  Data exceeding qualification limits would cause disqualification of a sensor 
and could not result in an engine shutdown due to faulty data.  The algorithms were validated in the lab using data 
from hundreds of ground tests and flights.  The hardware and software was ground tested on nominal tests and also 
on tests where accelerometers and cables were purposefully damaged to verify the effectiveness of the algorithm to 
detect faulty signals and disqualify the redline. 
The first AHM controller was flown in monitor-only mode on STS-116 in December 2006.  The first AHM 
controller flown in redlines-active mode was on STS-117 in June 2007.  All flights from that point on incorporated 
AHM controllers with redlines active. 
 
Figure 9.  Block II High Pressure Fuel 
Turbopump 
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H. Improvements in Reliability and Maintenance 
The design improvements made 
throughout SSME’s history 
significantly improved reliability, 
reusability, and maintenance.  The 
block changes discussed above and 
the implementation of AHMS 
culminated in a four-fold reduction in 
the probability of a catastrophic 
failure due to a SSME (Figure 10).  
Useable life on all components also 
increased significantly.  Many major 
components were tested in excess of 
100 times.   
 
With the increases in reliability 
and durability of components, 
maintenance has also been 
significantly reduced.  A major 
portion of the maintenance reduction 
came with the incorporation of the 
Block I and Block II high pressure 
turbopumps.  The turbopumps do not have to be removed after flight for inspections, eliminating a significant 
amount of engine disassembly and reassembly effort.  The time required to inspect and prepare an engine between 
flights has been reduced by 57% as illustrated in Figure 11. 
 
 
Figure 11.  Maintenance Improvements Throughout SSME History 
III.  
 
Figure 10.  SSME Reliability Improvements 
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IV. Engine Assembly and Processing 
A. Engine Assembly 
For the majority of the Space Shuttle Program, SSMEs were assembled at Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne’s 
Canoga Park, California facility.  Engines were then shipped to Stennis Space Center (SSC) for testing.  
Development engines remained at SSC.  Flight engines were tested and, pending successful post-test inspections and 
a completed engine acceptance review, delivered to Kennedy Space Center where they were readied for flight.  KSC 
personnel maintained and inspected the engines pre- and post-flight.  Processing activities evolved with the program.  
Though originally built in Canoga Park, the set of Block I engines was recycled into either Block IIA or Block II 
engines at KSC.  In addition, new engines built after these recycles were all assembled at KSC.  All the engines 
either recycled or built at KSC were shipped to SSC for testing. 
B. Engine Post-Flight Processing 
Because the SSME was a reusable engine, inspections and maintenance were required between flights.  The 
standard processing flow for any mission began at the end of the previous mission (Figure 12).  After each landing, 
the Orbiter was returned to the Orbiter Processing Facility (OPF).  Landings at sites other than KSC were supported 
by KSC personnel in order to ensure that all standard processing necessary prior to ferry flight occurred as it would 
have at KSC.  Early in the Shuttle Program, engine maintenance was accomplished while the engines were still 
installed in the Orbiter’s aft compartment unless an anomaly required their removal.  Orbiter processing with 
SSMEs installed generated work conflicts in the aft compartment.  Beginning with STS-26R in late 1988, SSMEs 
were removed after each flight.  This resulted in an overall reduction in Orbiter processing flow duration.  After 
removal, engines were moved to the SSME Processing Facility (SSMEPF) for inspections and maintenance. 
Returning engines were subjected to a rigorous series of inspections documented in the Operation, Maintenance, 
and Requirements Specification Document.  A set of standard repairs existed for many conditions.  Anomalies that 
were found to be outside the documented set of acceptable or repairable limits were evaluated by the SSME 
engineering team before repair or re-use.  Performance data was scrutinized by NASA and Pratt & Whitney 
Rocketdyne for any anomaly that might require additional inspections or analysis.  Logistics data was also 
scrutinized.  Starts and seconds for all serialized parts were maintained in an electronic database along with 
applicable inspection and life limits.  Following every mission, the database was checked and, if the remaining life 
on hardware was less than required for the subsequent mission, the applicable components were replaced. 
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Figure 12.  Typical SSME Processing Flow at Kennedy Space Center 
After all required post-flight work was accomplished, the engines were moved to the OPF and installed for the 
next flight.  Installation typically took one shift per engine.  The Orbiter was eventually rolled out of the OPF and 
into the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) and stacked.  Once the vehicle was secured at the Pad, Flight Readiness 
Tests (FRTs) were conducted on the engine to check the control system.  Additional leak checks and visual 
inspections were performed close to launch to ensure that no collateral damage occurred to the engines during final 
Orbiter or vehicle work. 
V. Testing4 
Testing throughout the SSME program was used to develop and 
prove the design, understand operation, reveal failure modes, and 
investigate and resolve anomalies.  Component level tests and rig 
tests of subcomponents were crucial to SSME’s success and were 
used in many ways including developing and investigating the 
design of seals, investigating issues such as anomalous frequencies 
on impellers, demonstrating durability of bearings, and developing 
components like turbopumps.  These smaller scale rig and 
component tests yielded faster and cheaper results over wider 
operational ranges than would have been possible with engine-level 
testing alone.  However, it is the engine-level tests that were 
ultimately used as a measure of flight readiness for the engine and its 
components.   
Throughout the SSME program, engine-level tests were 
conducted primarily on four test stands at Stennis Space Center (SSC) in Mississippi, though engine testing has also 
been done at the Rocketdyne Santa Susana Field Laboratory in California and on the Technology Test Bed (TTB) at 
Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) in Huntsville, Alabama.  Engine testing began in May, 1975 at SSC and 
ended there in July, 2009.  Engine starts and accumulated time are listed in Table 2. 
 
Figure 13.  SSME Test at SSC 
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Table 2.  SSME Operation—Starts and Seconds 
ULocation of Engine Hot-fires UNumber of Hot-fires UTime in Operation 
A1 Test Stand at SSC 1,007 tests 344,458 seconds 
A2 Test Stand at SSC 920 tests 301,495 seconds 
B1 Test Stand at SSC 363 tests 165,279 seconds 
Main Propulsion Test Article (MPTA) 
at SSC 
18 tests of a 3-engine cluster  
= 54 hot-fires 10,804 seconds 
A3 Test Stand at Santa Susana 320 tests 57,742 seconds 
Technology Test Bed (TTB) 
at MSFC 66 tests 7,939 seconds 
Flight Readiness Firings 
on Orbiters at KSC 
7 FRFs of a 3-engine cluster  
= 21 hot-fires 449 seconds 
On-Pad Aborts 
at KSC 
5 aborts of a 3-engine cluster  
= 15 hot-fires 45 seconds 
Space Shuttle Launches 135 launches of a 3-engine cluster  = 405 hot-fires 207,466 seconds 
TOTAL 3,171 hot-fires 1,095,677 seconds 
 
SSME test objectives can be divided into development, certification, and operational tests.  Some tests had 
objectives in multiple categories, for example sometimes certification tests of improved components occurred during 
operational testing of an engine configuration. 
A. Development Testing 
Development tests were conducted on the basic design and were used to develop safe start and shutdown 
transients, demonstrate mainstage operation, and evaluate the integrity of the hardware.  This phase helped form the 
foundation of the program, demanded navigation of a very steep learning curve, and yielded results that shaped the 
final engine design.   
The first tests were designed to develop 
the start sequence (Figure 14).  Math 
models indicated propellant conditions and 
valve timing would be critical.  It took 37 
tests and 13 turbopump replacements to 
achieve minimum power level, which was 
50% RPL at the time, and ninety-five tests 
to reach 100% RPL.  It was late in 1978 
before the first flight start sequence was 
finalized.1,2  During the first development 
tests, much was also learned regarding the 
processing and preparation of the engine.  
Pre-start thermal conditioning, purging 
requirements, and engine controller 
software for monitoring and control were 
established.  Post-test processing such as 
engine drying, inspection techniques, and 
leak checks were developed, which formed 
the foundation for future flight processing requirements. 
Testing of the FMOF engine configuration continued to aggressively explore the capability of the engine and its 
major components.  Figure 15 illustrates the problems encountered during the FMOF development history.  Each 
problem led to insight into engine operation as well as durability, and each problem resulted in redesigns to resolve 
 
Figure 14.  SSME Start Sequence 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0
Time From Engine Start (secs)
V
a
lv
e
 C
o
m
m
a
n
d
s
 (
%
 F
u
ll
 O
p
e
n
)
FPOV Command
OPOV Command
CCV Command
MFV
Command
MOV
Command
Full Closed-Loop Open-Loop Open-Loop Open-Loop Mixture Ratio Control: 
Partial Closed-Loop Full Closed-Loop Full Closed-Loop Open-Loop Thrust Control: 
37 tests and 13 turbopump 
replacements required before 
achieving mainstage power level 
 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
 
13 
the issues.  Engine development tests conducted during this period included tests demonstrating malfunction modes 
such as loss of electronic redundancies and loss of hydraulic pressure. 
 
 Also in this early part of the 
program, a series of tests was 
conducted at SSC to simulate 
the orbiter’s aft section 
including a cluster of three 
SSMEs.  The hardware 
accumulated to conduct these 
tests was dubbed the Main 
Propulsion Test Article 
(MPTA).  Eighteen tests were 
conducted on the MPTA. 
The testing that immediately 
followed the first Shuttle flight 
began to push the boundaries of 
engine operation.  Tests were 
conducted for longer run times 
and at higher power levels 
leading to the certification of 
the Full Power Level engine and beyond.  Development testing was conducted on all proposed significant upgrades 
incorporated into SSME throughout the Shuttle program.5 
B. Certification Testing 
Certification of an engine configuration involved testing multiple engine samples using aggressive test profiles 
that explored the boundaries of the engine-to-vehicle interface requirements.  In order to gain confidence in the 
FMOF engine for flight, a Preliminary Flight Certification (PFC) test program was conducted prior to the first flight.  
Prior to STS-1, SSME had accumulated 726 starts and over 110,000 seconds.   
Just as certification was required before the first flight of an engine configuration, it was also required before the 
flight of any design change.  In some cases, small changes to hardware were certified by similarity to the previous 
design of the part or by analysis.  Significant changes often required certification tests. 
The number of tests required, test profiles, and test durations included in a certification plan depended on the 
complexity or extent of the changes being incorporated into the baseline design.  For example, one change to Liquid 
Air Insulation required only one certification engine test.  The advent of the Block II HPFTP required a certification 
series of twenty-two tests on each of two samples.   
Typically, certification tests were designed to exercise the boundaries of operation expected in flight so that as 
many conditions as possible are experienced for the first time in a ground test rather than in flight.  Since design 
changes were incorporated periodically throughout SSME’s history, certification tests were almost continually a part 
of SSME’s testing program and were essential in proving the flight-worthiness of all SSME hardware. 
C. Operational Testing 
Operational testing was conducted on hardware designs already approved for flight.  Every major component on 
every SSME was acceptance tested prior to flight.  Additional reasons for conducting tests on production hardware 
are below. 
1. Issues Affecting Single Components or Engines 
There were many issues that only affected specific parts.  For example, hardware discrepancies that occurred 
during fabrication on individual parts sometimes were discovered during an acceptance test.  Often, the replacement 
of hardware required another test to ensure the problem was fixed.  Additionally, repairs or processing escapes 
occurred that required testing before continued flight use.  For example, unique post-flight Nozzle tube repairs 
sometimes required testing before returning to flight. 
2. Issues Affecting All Units of a Given Component 
Sometimes problems were discovered that called into questions the integrity of the whole fleet of a component.  
If the fleet was life limited to something less than required to meet the flight manifest, all units were rebuilt and re-
acceptance tested.  For example, a generic issue with the manufacturing of a filter internal to the Main Engine 
Controller forced all units to be life-limited, rebuilt with replacement filters, and re-acceptance tested.  
 
Figure 15.  Development History—Tests and Problems Prior to STS-1 
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3. In-Flight Anomaly Resolution, Investigation of a Ground-Observed Issue, and Development of Flight Rationale 
Quite often, tests on production designs were required to investigate issues and resolve anomalies that did not 
appear during development or certification.  Sometimes these anomalies occurred due to the number of cycles on the 
hardware being tested and therefore appeared after the development phase.  On other occasions, they appeared 
during production because they were related to specific stack-ups of tolerances or environments that had not 
occurred previously.  The SSME was reusable, and statistically significant numbers of them were not built.  It was 
impossible to test every combination of tolerances, even in one component, prior to flight.  Occasionally issues arose 
for which analysis alone could not provide flight rationale, whether the issue was discovered on the ground or in 
flight, and tests are required.  When anomalies occurred during a flight, the ensuing investigation often resulted in a 
requirement for ground tests to be conducted.   
4. Vehicle Issues 
Vehicle issues sometimes impact or implicate SSME and require ground testing for resolution.  For example, 
when inspection of orbiter MPS flowliners in 2002 found cracks just upstream of the inlet to the Low Pressure Fuel 
Turbopump (LPFTP), several subcomponent tests were conducted to investigate the interactions between the engine 
and vehicle.  In addition, modifications were made to engine test stands so that the problem could be further 
investigated.  The test results were used to set limits on operational speeds of the LPFTPs so as to refrain from 
operating in a high order cavitation regime detrimental to vehicle hardware.  It was also discovered during this time 
that the same high order cavitation that affected upstream hardware also interfered with predicted blade modes in the 
LPFTP, so the operational placards protected both sides of the interface. 
5. Flight Rule Changes and Demonstration 
Flight Rule demonstration was needed to support potential changes and was sometimes requested because 
conditions had never been previously run.   
6. Off-Nominal Testing 
Off-nominal testing was used throughout SSME’s history as a method of providing more extensive knowledge of 
how the engine operates and as a tool for determining margins against undesirable conditions.  These tests generally 
incurred more risk since the engine was being pushed outside its normal operating envelope.  A great deal of 
analysis, planning, and coordination was required to ensure the tests were conducted successfully and safely.  Off-
nominal tests included those designed to explore structural and performance margins, verify fail-operational (fail-
op)/fail-safe conditions, expand the launch criteria envelope, test the limits of ICD requirements, demonstrate 
operation at redline limits, examine the effects of process creep, demonstrate the durability of hardware with known 
flaws, and expose issues that could be related to the accumulation of starts and/or seconds of operation.  
Malfunctions at every stage of the launch: chill, start, mainstage, and shutdown were purposely introduced in ground 
tests.  Off-nominal tests included chill bleed interruptions, reduced chill-flow rate, purge interruptions, controller 
fail-op/fail-safe demonstrations such as controller major cycle restarts and controller channel switch-over.2  
Additionally, tests to simulate an SSME application for upper stage were conducted.  In every case the engines 
performed safely and as expected. 
D. Testing Summary and Conclusions 
Testing was an integral part of the SSME project and was critical in the success of the Shuttle Program.  Tests 
were conducted on this engine for more than thirty years and made it a very well-understood liquid rocket engine in 
spite of its complexity.  Testing was used to develop the engine, to expand operating envelopes, to investigate and 
resolve anomalies, and to implement design changes that added to the durability and operational envelope of the 
engine. 
Many problems were discovered through extensive testing.  Sometimes design changes that seemed small were 
found to have adverse impacts large enough to cause major failures.  Conversely, sometimes design changes thought 
to be large and significant proved to be improvements at their first implementation.  Without testing, the effects of 
modifications to systems as complex as SSME are impossible to accurately determine. 
While the benefits of testing are obvious at the onset of an engine development program, it is sometimes less 
obvious how important maintaining an active test program is in the production portion of a program.  SSME used 
engine testing many times near the close of the program to develop flight rationale.  Additionally, several large 
problems did not present themselves until late in production which, without an active test program, would have 
proved exceedingly difficult if not impossible to overcome. 
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VI. Benefits of a Long Program, Testing, and Reusability 
SSME used its strong engine test program to find problems on the ground in order to prevent encountering them 
in flight.  While several anomalies were noted during ascent, the engines operated safely and successfully on every 
flight.  In addition to testing, another reason for this was the benefit of flying a reusable engine.  Reusability forced 
long duration testing on the ground (every design was allowed to fly only 50% as long as it had been tested) and 
inspections of returning hardware.  Environments can be predicted and, to a degree, measured with instrumentation, 
but post-flight inspections offered insight into exactly how each part behaved.  Measurable improvements 
throughout the history of the program have been observed in the reduction of launch delays as illustrated in Figure 
16.  The more the SSME team strove to understand its hardware through extensive testing and inspections, the more 
they tried to improve it, and the safer it got.  The final 63 consecutive launches occurred without an SSME-related 
delay. 
 
Figure 16.  Launch Delays Due to SSME Throughout the History of the Program 
This greater understanding and improved design of the engine also resulted in a decline in major engine ground 
test incidents.  Figure 17 illustrates the total seconds of the SSME test program and the number of incidents over the 
years of operation. 
  
 
 
Figure 17.  Incident Occurrences Throughout SSME’s History 
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responsible for the advancement in the state of the art in many engineering disciplines.  For example, in fluid 
dynamics, extensive work was conducted understanding cavitation and increasing the abilities to model it; in 
structural dynamics, knowledge was gained in finite element prediction techniques, data acquisition techniques, and 
structural dynamics of extremely high frequency responses; in rotordynamics, better models exist to predict 
instability, synchronous responses, and external loading; in materials, continuous improvements were made in 
materials characterization and processing for reliability, performance, producibility, and reduced cost. 
VII. Conclusion 
The Space Shuttle Main Engine is the most technologically-advanced, high-performance rocket engine ever 
produced.  SSMEs successfully launched 135 Space Shuttle missions and accrued over one million seconds of hot-
fire time during ground tests and flight operation, more than any other large rocket engine, with a demonstrated 
engine reliability in excess of 0.9995.  The SSME was instrumental in material characterization and has advanced 
the state of the art in several engineering disciplines.  The extensive ground test program, multiple flights, and the 
ability to inspect the hardware after tests and flights made the SSME arguably the most well-understood rocket 
engine in history.  The experience gained during the evolution of the SSME program forms a fundamental 
foundation of liquid propulsion knowledge to benefit all future endeavors. 
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Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME)
Relentless Pursuit of Improvement
• SSME 101
• Design evolution
• Verification by ground test
• Analytical tool evolution
• Lessons
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SSME is the First Reusable Large
Liquid Rocket Engine
14 ft
7.5 ft
Propellants O2/H2
Rated power level (RPL) 469,448 lb
Nominal power level (104.5% RPL) 490,847 lb
Full power level (109% RPL) 512,271 lb
Chamber pressure (109% RPL) 2,994 psia
Specific impulse at altitude 452 sec
Throttle range (% RPL) 67 to 109
Gimbal range +/- 11°
Weight 7,748 lb
Service life
55 flights
27,000 seconds
Total program hot-fire time
3,171 starts
1,095,677 seconds
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High Performance
Staged Combustion Cycle
Hydrogen 
Inlet Low-Pressure
Fuel Turbopump
(LPFTP)
Oxidizer
Valve
(FPOV)
Main Oxidizer
Valve (MOV)
High-Pressure
Fuel Turbopump
(HPFTP)
Chamber
Coolant
Valve (CCV)
Nozzle
Main Combustion
Chamber (MCC)
High-Pressure
Oxidizer Turbopump
(HPOTP)
Oxidizer
Valve
(OPOV)
Low-Pressure
Oxidizer Turbopump
(LPOTP)
Oxygen 
Inlet
Main 
Injector
Fuel 
Preburner
Main 
Fuel
Valve 
(MFV)
Oxidizer
Preburner
Powerhead
• All propellants consumed – performance, 
efficiency
• Five variable valves – flexibility, wide 
operational control
• Serial low- and high-pressure pumps –
wide flow range
• Fail-op / fail-safe control system      
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SSME Block Improvements Timeline
1970s 1980s 2010s1990s 2000s
1st Flight1st Test
1st Block I, IA Flights
1st BIIA Flight
STS-107STS-51L
2
0
1
1
1st Flight
First Manned 
Orbital Flight
Block I/IA
Block IIA/II
Phase II
1st Flight
Health Management 1st Flight
STS-1 STS-135
Full Power 
Level
1st BII Flight
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Full Power Level (Phase I) SSME
First Flight — April 1983
Low Pressure Oxidizer 
Turbopump
• Turbine discharge 
turning vane mod
Low Pressure Fuel  
Turbopump
• Revised blocking area
Powerhead 
• Changes to Hot Gas Manifold fuel bowl 
liner, lox posts in Fuel Preburner
• New flow meter straightener
• Lox post shields
HPFTP
• Kel-F seals
• Smooth interstage seals
• Increased turbine blade tip clearances
HPOTP
• Housing material changed
Nozzle
• Increased tube wall 
thickness
• Added steam loop
• 1st Flight STS-6 (April 1983)
• 147 Required Changes from Baseline 
Engine Incorporated to Enable 
Operation at 109% Power Level
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Phase II SSME
First Flight — September 1988
Powerhead 
• Main Injector oxidizer inlet vane rework
MCC 
• EDNi reinforced outlet neck
HPTPs
• Desensitize coolant system
• Bearing and blade improvements
• Rotor stability
Ducts
• Low Pressure Fuel Duct helium barrier
Block II Controller
• New type and increased memory
• Improved  producibility and maintainability
• High order language for software
Nozzle
• Added insulation 
to aft manifold 
and drain lines
LPOTP
• Thrust Bearing 
lock-nut spacer• 1st Flight STS-26R
• Fully Recertified to 104% RPL
• 0.9994 Demonstrated High Reliability
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Block I SSME
First Flight — July 1995
Single Tube Heat Exchanger
• Eliminated all 7 criticality 1 
interpropellant welds
• FOD tolerant 25% thicker tubes 
• Low maintenance
Two-Duct Powerhead
• Improved liner and injector life
• Baffleless main injector
• Thick, cut-back turning vanes
• Eliminated 74 welds
• Part count reduced by 52
• Cycle time reduced 40%
Alternate High Pressure
Oxidizer Turbopump
• Precision castings
• Ceramic bearing balls
• Eliminated seal pressure redline
Hot Gas Temp Sensors
• Improved reliability• 1
st Flight STS-70
• Improved Safety, Reliability, & 
Operability
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Large Throat Main Combustion Chamber
• Engine pressure & temperatures reduced up to 10%
• Increased channel wall cooling
• Simple cast manifolds, eliminated 52 welds
• Cost & cycle time reduction over 50%
Low Pressure 
Oxidizer 
Turbopump
• Ceramic bearing balls
• Robust rotor 
alignment
• Increased 
performance inducer
High Pressure Fuel 
Turbopump
• One-piece EDM turbine inlet
• Increased life turbine blades
• Improved rotor balance 
Block IIA SSME
First Flight — January 1998
Low Pressure 
Fuel  
Turbopump
• Kevlar jacket 
insulation
• Reblocked nozzle
• Eliminated plug 
weld
Main Injector
Specific Impulse
Modifications
• Eliminated parasitic 
hydrogen losses
• 0.4 sec Isp recovery
Software
• Self-calibrating 
actuators
• Nominal coefficients
• Improved logic
• Increased redundancy 
thermocouples
Purge Check 
Valves
• Added upstream 
Filters
• 1st Flight STS-89
• >2x Reliability Improvement
• Certified to 104.5% Nominal Thrust
• Improved Safety, Life, & Operability
• Reduced Cost
Pratt & Whitney  Rocketdyne
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SSME Block II & AHMS
First Flight — June 2001
Block II High Pressure
Fuel Turbopump
• Improved turbine blade fatigue 
capability
• Robust turbine housing
• Pump Inlet Housing burst margin 
increased
• Stiffer/heavier rotor
• Robust hybrid bearing systems
• Extensive use of precision investment 
castings
• Coolant liner redline eliminated
• 1st Flight STS-104
• AHMS 1st Flight STS-117 (June 2007)
• Improved System Reliability, 
Operability, & Safety
• Goal of 10 Missions Between 
Overhauls
Advanced Health Management 
System
• Real-time spectral analysis performed 
to detect and measure high pressure 
turbopump synchronous frequencies
• Controller modified to respond to 
vibration data by disqualifying a sensor 
or shutting an engine down when 
necessary
Pratt & Whitney  Rocketdyne
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SSME Ascent Risk Improvement
SSME Configuration
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SSME  Launch  Performance
Goal:  No Delays, Scrubs, or Aborts
Scheduled Flights On Schedule D On-Pad Delay
A On-Pad Abort
S On-Pad Scrub
63 Consecutive Launches Since STS-73 (October 1995) 
without an SSME-caused Delay, Scrub, or Abort.
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SSME Maintenance Reduction
Block I
Block II
• Engine removal and shop maintenance
• Several major components removed from 
engine post-flight
• On-engine inspection of Block I HPOTP
• 57% less maintenance than Phase II
• On-engine inspection of Block II HPFTP
• Check valve filters
• Inspections reviewed/optimized
SSMEPF
Phase II
SSME R/R
OPF VABPAD
Engine Shop
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SSME Ground Testing
Key to Program Success
• Testing has been used throughout 
the SSME program 
• In Development:
• To evaluate design integrity
• For Certification:
• To demonstrate the evolved 
design is ready for flight
• On the Production Design:
• To investigate and resolve
anomalies
• To verify & expand operating 
margins
2,730 Starts / 887,717 Seconds of SSME Testing
Pratt & Whitney  Rocketdyne
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Command
SSME Block II Start Sequence
Propellant Valve Commands & Control Loops
Full Closed-LoopOpen-LoopOpen-LoopOpen-LoopMixture Ratio Control:
Partial Closed-Loop Full Closed-LoopFull Closed-LoopOpen-LoopThrust Control:
37 tests and 13 turbopump 
replacements required before 
achieving 50% Rated Power Level
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Development Testing
Data from Early in the Program
• Ninety-five tests to reach 100% RPL
• Late 1978 before first flight start sequence was finalized
• 147 design changes deemed necessary for Full Power Level (109% RPL)
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Year
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
800
700
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400
300
200
100
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160
140
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100
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60
40
20
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1
2
3
3
4
5
3
5
The Problems
1. Start Sequence
2. High Pressure Fuel Turbopump Whirl
3. High Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump Explosion
4. Fuel Preburner Burn Through
5. High Pressure Fuel Turbopump Turbine Failure
6. Main Oxidizer Valve Fire
7. Nozzle Steerhorn Failure
8. Main Fuel Valve Housing Rupture
3
5
6
Test Seconds
Rated Power Level
Test Seconds
STS-1
4
8
7
7
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Testing a Mature Design
• Determine acceptability of flight hardware 
• Investigate issues / resolve anomalies 
• Issues affecting single components or engines
• Issues affecting all units of a given component
• In-Flight Anomalies
• Issues requiring tests for flight rationale
• Vehicle issues
• Verify or increase operational envelope
• Flight Rule changes or demonstration
• Off-nominal testing (operational extremes)
• Malfunction testing to demonstrate redundancy
• Overtest to demonstrate safety margins
Tests have been conducted for each one of these reasons 
since 2000, in spite of SSME’s maturity.
Pratt & Whitney  Rocketdyne
19
• Testing is necessary even on a 
mature, well-understood, 
production engine
• Acceptance testing sometimes 
reveals issues in new hardware
• Some problems do not present 
themselves until late in production
• Many issues are related to the 
number of cycles on components
• Small numbers of assets means 
not all tolerance stack-ups or 
environments can be explored
• Process escapes can occur at any 
time
Conclusions About Testing
• Some design features (mating of certain components, for example) can only be 
demonstrated during a hotfire
• Some issues are vehicle-driven or are related to flight operations that change outside the 
engine program’s control
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Evolution of Analytical Tools, Materials
Key to SSME Success
• SSME is:
• A success because of the advances made in many engineering disciplines
• Responsible for the advancement in the state of the art in many engineering disciplines
Blocking 
Plates
Nozzle
1st & 2nd Stage Rotor Stator
F
lo
w
 D
ire
c
tio
n
• Advances in engineering disciplines include:
• Fluid Dynamics:  Improved understanding of 
cavitation and increased abilities to model it
• Structural Dynamics:  Increased knowledge in 
finite element prediction techniques, data 
acquisition techniques, and structural dynamics 
of extremely high frequency responses
• Rotordynamics:  Better equipped to model and 
predict instability, synchronous responses, and 
external loading
• Materials:  Continuous improvements made in 
material characterization and processing for 
reliability, performance, producibility, and 
reduced cost
Edgetones
Acoustic modes
Overlay of edgetones and 
acoustic modes
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• Test outside the comfort zone
• Go beyond normal operation
• Understand margins, engine characteristics
• Use the lessons learned along the way
• Identify problems on the ground, not in flight
• Drive for understanding
• Define environments
• Be thorough in data mining
• “Listen” to the hardware
• Match models and experience
• Utilize knowledge of hands-on technicians
• Fix problems, don’t manage them
• Incorporate multiple changes in blocks to reduce test costs
• Don’t be afraid of unconventional ideas
Lessons from SSME’s
Relentless Pursuit of Improvement
